The Brussels trilateral meeting of European Council President Antonio Costa, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on July 14 was concluded with warm handshakes and statements on the deepening of the EU-Armenia partnership. At this very moment, when it seemed that Armenia had finally confirmed its European orientation, the Prime Minister announced at a press conference that Armenia had applied for full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
From the EU to the SCO via transit
Relations with the EU have recently entered a qualitatively new phase. Ursula von der Leyen's visit to Yerevan, Armenia's adoption of the law announcing the start of the EU membership process, the progress made towards visa liberalization, the EU's promise to invest 2.5 billion euros within the framework of the "Global Gateways" initiative, as well as the responsible role assumed by the EU in Armenia's security system, created a more stable pro-European dynamic. And the Prime Minister's words at the July 16 press conference that "Armenia wants to become an EU member" and that Armenia could be part of the EU in 20 years gave this dynamic a strategic perspective.
Meanwhile, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formed initially as a counterbalance to the Western economic order. Russia and China initiated the SCO as an alternative eastern economic platform, around which several Asian countries have united. The Prime Minister's statement on applying for membership in this organization is packaged with the justification of "balancing" all strategic directions. In other words, the same logic applies in the case of adopting the law to join the EU, while being a member of the EAEU. And in such conditions, the question arises: is it possible to maintain such a delicate balance, walking on the razor blades of contradictions of geopolitical poles?
Some may call this diplomatic flexibility, while others call it political tightrope walking. But the reality is more complicated.
The Prime Minister's statement "to become an EU member in 20 years," no matter how vague, actually suggests that Yerevan realizes that EU membership is not possible in the coming years. Therefore, it is not guided by romantic illusions, but is slowly building a partnership with the EU, emphasizing more and more that this is not a current political orientation for it, but rather a civilizational preference.
Europe, in turn, is not trying to artificially accelerate or deepen Armenia's integration, without inspiring excessive hopes, as in the case of Georgia or Ukraine. Instead, the parties cooperate with moderate goals in the protection of democracy, institutional stability, and security. In this sense, they are playing fairly honestly and openly with each other.
The fact that Pashinyan announced Yerevan's desire to join the SCO two days after he visited Brussels, and that such a seemingly political turnabout step, at least for now, has not been followed by any public response from European centers, indicates that Brussels is not only aware of the move but also not against it. This may suggest that Brussels is aware or understands that the initiative to join the SCO is not a genuine turnabout, but a tactical maneuver. Otherwise, it is hard to believe that the EU could have discussed plans to provide Yerevan with $2.5 billion.
Yerevan's Russian and Chinese targets and the American arbitrator
Another circumstance suggests that the statement is not a new strategic choice. Armenia does not even have observer status in the SCO. The application for such status has remained unanswered by the SCO member states for about 10 years. That is to say, on the one hand, the SCO and especially its two leading actors, Russia and China, were not particularly interested in Armenia's involvement, and Armenia did not particularly need membership, because during these years it did not insist, ask, or insist on making the issue of its membership a subject of discussion. In such conditions, suddenly raising the issue of membership is like jumping on one's knees.
But what maneuver is this about? The first option is that Yerevan has tried to deprive Russia of the justification that Armenia is unilaterally moving away from the Russian axis. If Russia does nothing to assist Armenia in its membership in the SCO, it cannot demand that it not get closer to the EU. The application for membership in the SCO could be a diplomatic hint sent to Moscow that Armenia is ready for partnership in the East as well. Therefore, the ball is now in Russia's court. Moscow has not yet responded to Armenia's Shanghai Cooperation Organization membership. Either it is not serious or it is not enthusiastic about Armenia's Shanghai perspective. In both cases, the problem is now Moscow's, not Yerevan's.
The second possible option is related to the China factor. The SCO is one of China's key instruments of influence. With this step, Armenia appears to be extending a political invitation to Beijing to become more active in the South Caucasus, particularly in the context of the "Crossroads of Peace" initiative. Yerevan views China not only as an Asian and global economic and political engine, but also as a potential investor in regional communication projects and in the "Crossroads of Peace" itself. That is, in a sense, Yerevan proposes to integrate the "Crossroads of Peace" into broader Asian concepts, aiming to enhance the economic and political value of its project. China's entry into the region can create new economic and locational opportunities for Armenia, and the SCO platform, even in the event of Armenia's indirect membership, can provide institutional stability to this cooperation. It is evident that, in addition to economic interests, a security interest is also at stake. Balancing the interests of superpowers with China's involvement in the region, particularly in terms of the economic and communication components, will significantly enhance the guarantees of regional security and stability.
However, there is one risk here: the US factor. The EU itself is striving to strengthen new-quality economic ties with China. But for Washington, China is the most serious geopolitical and geoeconomic adversary. Suppose Washington, which has signed a document on strategic cooperation with Armenia, perceives Yerevan's application for membership in the SCO not as a tactical step, but as a strategic orientation towards China. In that case, it may seriously reconsider its approaches towards Armenia. US President Trump recently threatened to impose about 15% higher tariffs on countries cooperating with the BRICS. And the SCO is a very micro-species of the BRICS. But if the new US administration, which claims the laurels of the torchbearer of "peacemaking", approaches it as a means of achieving peace in the region through the combination of economic interests, perhaps it will also encourage this step. In other words, the whole question is how Yerevan's horse moves will be assessed in Washington.
This foreign policy of Armenia, actively maneuvering between conflicting vectors, seems like newly kneaded dough that will still require a lot of kneading. As a result, a unique cake, neither Eastern nor Western, can be obtained, with a taste that embodies national-state sovereignty and subjectivity.
The most important thing is not to stumble while walking on a razor's edge...
Gor Abrahamyan
