The June 20 visit of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to Istanbul, at the invitation of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, took place in a regional environment where tensions are escalating day by day due to the Israel-Iran war. Just a day earlier, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was in Turkey to participate in the opening of the "Azerbaijani Quarter" built-in Kahramanmaraş after the devastating earthquake that struck Turkey in 2023. It was the second meeting between Erdogan and Aliyev in a month, again used to emphasize and glorify the strong Turkish-Azerbaijani "fraternal alliance." These "fraternal outbursts" were intended to provide a backdrop for Pashinyan and a message of joint readiness for a regional power realignment in the face of the dramatic situation surrounding Iran.

It is hard to believe that Aliyev and Erdogan did not discuss Pashinyan's visit. Most likely, they "wound their watches" together, having previously agreed on the content of the visit, and the Armenian Prime Minister could not help but take into account the conditions under which he was leaving for Istanbul in this regard.

What is hidden behind the curtain of Turkish demonstrative respect

Nevertheless, Turkey did everything to ensure the proper visit level and create a veil of friendship. The organization of Pashinyan's reception in Dolmabahçe, one of the most luxurious palaces in Istanbul, built by Armenian architects, had symbolic significance. In addition, no matter how trivial it may seem, Erdogan's gesture of accompanying Pashinyan to the car also demonstrated this attitude. However, what was hidden behind that smokescreen is essential.

The visit was dictated by the moment. In recent months, there have been no contacts, at least publicly, between the special representatives of Armenia and Turkey, Ruben Rubinyan and Serdar Kilic, and the "3+2" platform is effectively frozen. In other words, it isn't easy to consider the visit a result of the maturation of the slow process of normalization between Armenia and Turkey that began in 2021.

Erdogan's invitation to Pashinyan is related to the new military-political situation that has developed around Iran and, in connection with it, to certain calculations of Ankara.

It is noteworthy that the Erdogan-Pashinyan meeting was relatively short, the status of the visit was working, and after the negotiations themselves, the two leaders did not make any joint statement or briefing. This suggests that the visit and meeting were more aimed at "exploring" the moods on sensitive regional issues affecting their interests, perhaps presenting each other with their visions of guarantees of stability in the conditions of the new regional realities created, than at reaching specific agreements. It is no coincidence that the official statements following the meeting from both Yerevan and Ankara were remarkably stingy, aimed only at emphasizing the bilateral desires to normalize relations.

A corridor ghost from behind Iran

Both sides emphasized the importance of resolving the peace process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, suggesting that signing a peace treaty and its Azerbaijani conditions were one of the main issues on the agenda.

The most sensitive topic, however, which is also directly related to the prospect of signing a peace treaty and is gaining more and more priority for Azerbaijan and Turkey as the noose around Iran tightens, is the issue of the so-called "Zangezur Corridor." The processes around and inside Iran have created a real obstacle to the plan for uninterrupted land transport communication between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan (meaning Turkey) through Iranian territory, which had already been agreed upon with Tehran. Iran proposed this precisely to politically neutralize the possibility of imposing the "Zangezur Corridor" plan on Armenia by force.

The new situation created cannot but again pose the question of Baku and Ankara to make revisions. Notably, the Armenian government's statement hints at Erdogan's interest in the "Crossroads of Peace" initiative put forward by Yerevan. The implementation of this project would be impossible without Turkey and Iran. It is not excluded that Ankara is trying to put forward a hybrid idea to combine this project with the communication expectations put forward by Baku. The problem was that for Ankara, at least at the moment, it is not very profitable to enter into a confrontation with Iran because the weakening of Iran implies that the next target of Israel will be Ankara itself. It was no coincidence that just two days ago, Erdogan boasted that after a short time, it would no longer be possible to speak with Turkey in the language of force. Therefore, Ankara will likely try to establish a land connection with Azerbaijan without violating Iran's interests but also taking advantage of its weakening focus on the issue.

Turkish gambit or chance for balancing

Regardless, this was a visit whose possible reactions and consequences will be visible later. This is not the first time that the head of Armenia has paid a bilateral visit to Turkey at the invitation of the head of the Turkish state. The first time this happened was in 2009, when, at the invitation of Turkish President Abdullah Gul, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan traveled to the Turkish city of Bursa to jointly watch a football match between the national teams of the two countries, which began the so-called "football diplomacy" of Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. But there is a significant difference. Gul did not have absolute power in Turkey, and his initiative to normalize relations was unsuccessful. The signed protocols were never ratified, and shortly after, Erdogan removed from power the two figures who were the authors of that initiative and the "zero problems with neighbors" foreign policy doctrine: President Abdullah Gul and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.

In this case, the invitation was from Erdogan, who holds absolute totalitarian power, and the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, which at that time became a prerequisite for the ratification of the protocols by Turkey and was rejected by Yerevan, practically does not exist. The whole question is whether Erdogan is approaching the issue with a genuine desire to normalize relations with Armenia or not and whether, despite their shared interests with Azerbaijan, they have sufficient will to establish diplomatic and economic ties with Armenia or they remain dependent on Baku's whims.

There are, of course, not many grounds for optimism. However, it is also in this sense that Pashinyan's visit, in addition to being historic, becomes essential. It is an opportunity to communicate directly at a high level and, most importantly, without the intervention of third parties, with a player who is continuously increasing its influence in the region and is at the same time critical for Armenia's security, to present Armenia's ideas on regional issues, the potential of bilateral and multilateral relations, and also to directly understand what is expected of it, what expectations it may have.

This does not mean that a real opportunity is being created to cause a rift in the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance or, even more so, to substitute Russia's interests for Turkey's, especially in a situation when Russian-Turkish relations are pretty stable and behind-the-scenes games between them can turn into a game of cat and mouse. A visit of such a level is, first of all, a manifestation of Armenia's subjectivity. It is also an attempt to find a formula for safely navigating between the interests of the superpowers and balancing these interests. To do this, you need to talk to all sides, not let them speak for you.

Gor Abrahamyan