Responsible Statecraft published an article by Sarang Shidore, director of the Global South Program at the Queens Institute and a professor at George Washington University, analyzing the military tensions between India and Pakistan.
“India launched a series of strikes into Pakistani territory on Tuesday in response to a terrorist attack on tourists in the Kashmir Valley on April 22. The incident raised new questions about what Washington could and should do when two nuclear powers clashed. What are the United States’ interests in the region, and how should they be protected?
US President Donald Trump, responding to these events, noted: “We knew something was going to happen... they have been fighting for many years, decades.” He also expressed hope that “it will all end very quickly.” Washington had earlier strongly condemned the terrorist attack, which marked the beginning of a new era of violence, and had called on the two neighboring countries to show restraint.
The United States has a deep interest in the fight against terrorism. Most of the militant groups operating in Pakistan date back to the Cold War, when Islamist groups were used as a tool in Washington’s strategic approach to countering the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The legacy of that conflict has had serious consequences, including the aggravation of India-Pakistan relations, which date back to the colonial partition of India in 1947.
All of this, however, is now history. Today, it is clear that the United States has limited interests and influence in South Asia. In the fight against terrorism, Washington and New Delhi have forged a long-standing, bipartisan partnership, especially since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, which were carried out by the Pakistani extremist group Lashkar-e-Taiba. The Trump administration recently extradited to India Tahawwur Rana, a Canadian citizen of Pakistani origin who was convicted in the United States for his role in the attacks.
In addition to seeking to bring the terrorists to justice, the United States, like the rest of the world, has an interest in preventing a nuclear conflict in the region. The risk of nuclear weapons use in South Asia is primarily attributed to Pakistan. Unlike India, Pakistan’s nuclear strategy does not exclude the possibility of a first strike. Islamabad could theoretically use its tactical nuclear arsenal as a response to a full-scale Indian invasion. However, such a scenario is currently far from being a reality.
In the past six years, India This is the second military conflict between India and Pakistan, a testament to the challenges of the post-unipolar world order. In such a world, many states seek greater sovereignty and decision-making independence, especially those in the Global South. Some may use this autonomy to take decisive steps guided by their perceived national interests. The United States cannot always control this process. Moreover, it cannot “resolve” conflicts with deep historical roots in distant regions. The Trump administration seems to instinctively recognize this reality, at least in the case of South Asia,” the article says.
Prepared by Arman Galoyan